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Socialist Concepts of Sovereignty:
The Case for Romania
Introduction
0 N SEPTEMBER 26, 1968, Pravda declared that "a socialist
state that is in a system with other states constituting a social-
ist commonwealth, cannot be free of the common interest of that
commonwealth." This, in the wake of the Soviet intervention in
Czechoslovakia, represented
the core of the "Brezhnev
THE AUTHOR: AUREL BRAUN (B.A., Doctrine" of limited sover-
M.A., University of Toronto) is a doc- eignty. Brezhnev personally
toral candidate in international rela-
tions at the London School of Econom- reiterated this principle on
ics. November 12, 1968 in a
speech at the Fifth Congress
of the Polish United Workers
Party, in Warsaw. He stated inter alia:
When the internal and external 'forces hostile to socialism seek
to turn back the development of any socialist country, to restore
the capitalist order, when a threat emerges to the cause of social-
ism in that country, a threat to the security of the socialist com-
monwealth as a whole, this is no longer a matter only for the
people of the country in question, but is also a common
problem which is a matter of concern for all socialist coun-
tries.1
He later denied the existence of such a doctrine in a speech he made
in Belgrade in 1971,2 but this denial has been met with skepticism
in the West, because the position of sovereignty in the socialist bloc
is still not entirely clear.
However, the concept of sovereignty is not only crucial to the
policies of the smaller socialist states such as Romania, which try
to maintain their autonomy, but it also represents a key element of
international law. Sovereignty in ordinary usage is understood to
be a state of independence from internal or external authority.
This cannot, however, explain the use of the concept of sovereign-
ty in relations among the Soviet bloc states and the evolution of
"socialist international law."
I L. Brezhnev, Sclnteia, Sept. 25, 1971.
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"Sovereignty" itself incorporates the phenomenon of the
nation-state. In the socialist context the qualities of this phenome-
non are determined by ideological development. Marxism-
Leninism has gone through a number of phases regarding the via-
bility and the future of the nation-state. Moreover, its notion of the
nation-state has been subjected to the polycentrical pull which saw
Poland denounce the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 and
Romania vehemently oppose the Soviet intervention in Czechoslo-
vakia in 1968. Soviet support for universal class struggle in turn
has had to compete with Soviet support of national liberation
and sovereignty in the emerging nations of the Third World.
In the areas dominated by the Soviet Union we see another
dichotomy as expressed by Max Beloff, namely, that the Soviets
impose real derogations of sovereignty on these countries, yet they
respect their sovereignty in formal terms and are committed to a
belief in the general validity of the concept. 3 A secondary problem
which also interposes itself at this stage is the increased frequency
of Soviet references to "people's sovereignty." The question is
whether in Eastern Europe there can be a divergence between the
people or the nation and the nation-state. The answer was crucial
in the Prague intervention of 1968 and remains so.
Modern industrial development creates a considerable degree
of interdependence among states and the socialist countries have
recognized this. Indeed, in Eastern Europe the Soviet Union has
been pressing for closer cooperation and rationalization of produc-
tion. However, ever closer cooperation moving towards supra-
national integration is seen as a threat to individual sovereignty
by some of the socialist states. The conflict between sovereignty
and possible supranational integration (i.e., a process of inter-
penetration of different aspects of a state's autonomy), extends to
the common socialist bloc institutions such as the Council for Mu-
tual Economic Assistance (Comecon) and the Warsaw Pact, and to
regional cooperation as a whole.
Finally, one must also consider the purpose for which the con-
cept of sovereignty is used. The Soviet jurist G.I. Tunkin has
stated that the principles of socialist international law, of which
sovereignty is still a part, cannot be compared to general interna-
tional law in terminology. 4 In his view the purpose for which they
3 Beloff, Crisis of the European Nation-State, in 9 GOVERNMENT AND Opposition
1 (Winter 1974) at 25.
4 G. I. TUNKIN, TEORIIA MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRAVA 495 (2d ed. Moscow 1970)
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are applied determines their character. Romania, for instance, has
used the term "sovereignty" to resist socialist supranational plan-
ning. It will therefore be the purpose of this article to analyze
not only variations in the socialist view of sovereignty, but also to
see whether a country such as Romania can employ the concept
as a defense of its autonomy in the face of the might of the Soviet
Union.
Can Romania adopt the Soviet theoretical position on interna-
tional law and sovereignty to justify policies at variance with those
of the Soviet Union?
The Endurance of the Nation-State
The eventual withering away of the nation-state has been one
of the chief assumptions of Marxist doctrine; however, as to the
question of sovereignty it is essential to determine when this pro-
cess will take place in order that short and long range policies can
be formulated. Ralph Miliband, the British Marxist scholar,
contends that orthodox Marxism anticipated that although' a state
of considerable duration would remain after the Revolution, it
would immediately begin to wither away.5 Lenin also analyzed the
post-revolutionary state in The State and Revolution, written before
the 1917 Revolution. He wrote that:
Once the revolution is completed and the dictatorship of
the proletariat established, after a time, more or less
long, but the variable depending on the circumstances,
the decline of the state would commence. What would
decline would be the Proletarian half-statc or the transitional
type of state. [Emphasis added]6
Thus, Lenin went further than Marx and stated that on the morrow of
the Revolution the state would not only begin to wither away but
would already be in an advanced state of decomposition. While
there would still be a revolutionary power in existence it would not
be exercised by the state in the usual manner. Lenin notes that,
"it is a state nevertheless," but "in the shape of armed workers who
proceed to form a militia involving the entire population." '  The
in Hazard, Renewed Emphasis upon a Socialist International Law, 65 AM. J. INT'L L.
142, 145.
Miliband, State and Revolution, in LENIN TODAY 78 (Sweezy and Maldoft eds.
1970).
' CHAMBRE, FROM KARL MARX TO MAO 185 (1963).
7 V. I. LENIN, 9 SELECTED WORKS 336 (Lawrence and Wishard pubs. 1937).
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proletariat would govern but not dominate. The bureaucracy
would be drastically reduced in size and would remain utterly re-
strained by direct popular supervision backed up by the power of
instant revocability, while the other key institution, the army,
would be abolished. Finally, the "rotten parliamentarism of bour-
geois society would be replaced by the Soviets." 8 Therefore, at
this stage Lenin considered the class struggle the most important
part of the transition to communism. State sovereignty seemed
only incidental to him. Nor did he give much consideration at
this point to national liberation or equality among states.
The State and Revolution raised a great many problems. The
dictatorship of the proletariat is inconceivable without some degree
of political articulation and leadership, which in turn implies po-
litical organization. Nor did Lenin clarify in this work what the
relationship would be between the proletariat, whose dictatorship
the revolution is deemed to establish, and the vanguard party which
educates, leads, directs and organizes. However, by 1919 Lenin
did say:
Yes, the dictatorship of one party. We stand upon it and can-
not depart from this ground, since this is the party which in
the course of the decades has won for itself the position of the
vanguard of the whole factory, and industrial proletariat.'
Thus, by 1919, he asserted the exclusive guidance of the party in
a nation-state. Furthermore, Lenin held that the attempt to dis-
tinguish between the dictatorship of the class and the dictatorship
of the party was "an unbelievable and inextricable confusion of
thought." 1  By 1921, as Robert V. Daniels notes, Lenin bluntly as-
serted that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible ex-
cept through the Communist Party" (i.e., the state organ)." Thus,
The State and Revolution seems to be something of an aberration in
Lenin's work, for he held out for state supremacy after the Revolu-
tion. Moreover, he would not admit to any possible dichotomy
between the state, controlled by the Communist Party, and the
interests of the proletariat. It is also significant to note from the
very beginning Soviet doctrine was made quite flexible in order to
comply with "objective realities." Faced with the failure of the
8 Miliband, supra note 5, at 81.
9 Id. at 84.
10 CARR, I THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION 230 (London 1950).
11 Daniels, The State and Revolution, in 12 AMERICAN SLAVIC AND EAST EURO-
PEAN REVIEW 24 (1953).
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Revolution to spread to Western Europe and with the complexities
of governing a vast state, Lenin would change his view on the state
and class struggle or at the very least reorganize his priorities.
Stalin placed heavy emphasis on the continuation of the state.
Whereas one may claim that Lenin's post-Revolutionary stance on
the state was a tactical move based on certain general theoretical
assumptions, a move influenced by events in Western Europe,
Stalin's position had a sturdier theoretical framework. Stalin
believed that the role of the state in a socialist nation-state must
be that of an indispensable tool for the acceleration of "inevitable"
historical trends and that this positive role of the state deserved
serious recognition in Soviet ideological perspectives. 12 He placed
a growing reliance on state institutions and the administrative
structure. In the wake of World War II, the Soviet state was
glorified as almost co-equal the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union and any undermining of the state was said to harm so-
cialism.
The endurance and the significance of the state under socialism
has continued to be recognized in the post-Stalin era. Both
Khruschev and Brezhnev have repeatedly stressed that the state
continues to perform an essential function under socialism and that
it is to continue for a considerable period of time. Despite the so-
called "Brezhnev Doctrine" the present Soviet leader has admitted
to the formal sovereign rights of states and considers international
relations as still dominated by a state-centric system.
In Romania the continuance of the major role of the state ap-
pears to have an even greater amount of support in ideological-
juridical thinking than in the Soviet Union. Already, in 1965
Romanian President Nicolae Ceau~escu declared that:
Our experience, as that of the other socialist states shows
that the power of the state is-and will be for a long time the prin-
cipal instrument for the realization of the political-economic and
cultural tasks which are made more and more complex by the ad-
vancement of society. . . . [sic] The attributes of the state as
organizer of the national economy, of scientific and cultural
activities and in all domains of social life is growing consider-
ably) 3
Thus, Ceau~escu not only rejects any immediate withering away of
12 BRZEZINSKI, THE SOVIET BLOC: UNITY AND CONFLICT 105 (1967).
13 N. Ceau~escu, Report to the Grand National Assembly, in LUPTA DE CLASi,
Series A-VA(XLV) No. 9, at 10 (Bucharest Sept. 1965).
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the state, but rather claims that in the immediate future the role of
the state will be adigmented.
Romanian political theoreticians and jurists have enlarged on
this theory of the continuity of the state system. The Romanian
Communist Party (R.C.P.) theoretician, Ilie R~dulescu, has
written that Marxism-Leninism itself assumes that the state, as
well as the nation, will endure for a long time to come. In this
vein, he claims that the socialist state, while comprising part of the
superstructure, is in a continuous process of change and perfec-
tion. 14 He writes:
The elimination of the capitalist ownership of the means of pro-
duction and the placing of relations of production on the basis
of socialist property, creates an objective base of the rapid de-
velopment of the economy, making it even more necessary for
organized state intervention in overseeing the direction of the
planning of the economic activities.15
Therefore, he concludes that "reality" demonstrates the justification
of the thesis that the development of the forces of production and
that of the socialist leadership are, "unitary in all the domains of
activity and in the scope of harmonious development of the whole
society." 16 As his argument is supposed to be founded on the two
most solid bases possible in socialism, namely Marxism-Leninism
and "objective reality," it should be rather difficult for the Soviets
to refute.
The theory on the continuity and on the significance of the
state seems to have remarkably unanimous support among the
most influential Romanian political theorists and jurists. Profes-
sor D. I. Mazilu of the Faculty of Law of the University of Bucha-
rest, writing in the R.C.P. theoretical journal, Lupta de Clasi, at-
tacked Hans Morgenthau's thesis that the prevention of a nuclear
world war which would be tantamount to the destruction of civili-
zation, required the establishment of a world state and world -judi-
cial order.i7 Mazilu feels that the nation-state is and will remain
for a long time a basic factor underlying the progress of society and
a prime force in the development of the world community as a
whole.
14 1. Ridulescu, About The Role of Our Socialist State, in LUPTA DE CLASA, Series
A-VA(XLVI) No. 3, at 3 (Mar. 1966).
15 Id. at 16.
16 Id.
17 D. Mazilu, In Full Accord With the Fundamental Decisions of the Epoch, LuPTA
DE CLASA, Series A-VA(LI) No. 10, at 78 (Oct. 1971).
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Another theorist, V. Duculescu, writing in the new R.C.P.
theoretical journal, Era Socialist, claims that the socialist revolu-
tion in fact has helped to increase the significance of the sovereign
state and its growing participation in international life. The state,
he maintains, is the main subject of all rights and obligations aris-
ing out of international judicial relations:
It [the state] expresses the sovereign will of the nation which
has created it, exercises the right of self determination and is
not conditioned by the will of other judicial subjects such as
international organizations constituted by agreement of the sov-
ereign state."8
Professor Constantin Vlad, a member of the Romanian Acad-
emy of Social Sciences, continues developing the theory of the en-
durance and importance of the state in his new book Essays on Na-
tion [sic]. 9  He holds that the present historical period is
characterized by the "phenomenon of the nation." (He largely
identifies the nation with the nation-state). Moreover, as trends
towards national independence increase in the world, the nation-
state, in his view, becomes more significant as a new type of "hu-
man community;" it becomes part of the framework of interna-
tional relations.20 This change, he claims, has largely resulted
from the presence of socialist nations in the world, which represent
a higher stage in the development of the nation in the form of a
"community." The tenacity with which Vlad espouses the virtues
of the nation-state is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that in his
book he quotes Stalin on the definition of the nation. 21  Vlad
does not leave the slightest doubt that he believes that the nation-
state is a lasting institution.
Finally, Romanian confidence in the endurance of the nation-
state is not only reiterated domestically, but is also expressed in-
ternationally. At the IXth World Congress of the International
Political Science Association at Montreal in 1973, the Romanian
delegate, Professor I. Ceterchi of the Faculty of Law, University
of Bucharest, expressed great confidence in the nation-state,
which he claimed appeared in history at a period of high human
19 V. Duculescu, The Sovereign State in International Relations, 53 ERA SOCIAL-
ISTA 13 (Piala Scanteii, Bucharest). July 1973.
19 C. VLAD, ESSAY ON NATION (sic) (Bucharest 1973).
2o Id. at 8.
21 See J. STALIN, Marxism and the National Question in 2 WORKS 218 (Bucharest
1953), cited in VLAD, supra note 19, at 16.
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development.22 His definition of a nation bears note for the pos-
itive aspects which he emphasizes:
The nation can be defined as the highest form of ethical com-
munity in the contemporary and modern era, formed as an inde-
pendent unit within the border of a territory on the basis of its
national economy having an etatist political organization (rep-
resented by the nation-state) as well as a specific spiritual life
expressed in the language, the psychology, the culture and the
consciousness of the nation. 23
Moreover, Ceterchi believes that the transition to socialism is
linked with the necessity of the assertion of the nation "at a higher
level and linked to a national revival."
There is little disagreement between Soviet and Romanian
views that the existence of the nation-state is justified. Writers
and politicians from both states praise the development of the so-
cialist state and see its prolonged endurance. This belief that the
withering away of the state is not about to take place in the imme-
diate future makes the concept of the nation-state rest on a contin-
ually solid basis. Thus, sovereignty is an essential element in the
relationship among socialist states, especially in light of the Ro-
manian experience.
The frequency of Romanian pronouncements on the endurance
of the state are particularly striking in light of the fact that the
Soviet Union itself holds for the endurance of the state. It is
therefore reasonable to suppose that Romanian pronouncements
on the state are part of a larger strategy which benefits by constant
repetition. It is apparent that while Rdulescu, Mazilu, Ducules-
cu, Vlad, and Ceterchi discuss the same repetitive position of the
state ad nauseam, there are slight variations in their analyses which
allow them cumulatively to cover the entire spectrum of the evolu-
tion of the state. Thus, they touch on the role of the state in classic
Marxist-Leninist doctrine, in the transition from capitalism to
socialism in the socialist epoch, in relation to cultural development,
and in relation to "objective" domestic and international realities.
The Romanians have thus fortified a key component in their
theory of relations among socialist states; But, before analyzing the
problem of socialist relations, there is a second question with which
one must contend: whether under socialism there can be a di-
vergence between the state and the people.
22 1. Ceterchi, Sovereignty and Co-operation of States, in GOVERNMENT AND OP-
POSITION, pre-publication proof (London) (Mar. 1974).
23 Id.
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The State or the People
Most Soviet political writing and comments make little admis-
sion of the possibility of a discrepancy between the aims of the
people (i.e., the nation) in a socialist state and that of the state.
Indeed, in formal official doctrine there is supposed to be an "or-
ganic unity" between the two. On closer examination however,
the picture shifts and the possibility of a difference between the
Soviet bloc states and the Soviet bloc peoples becomes increas-
ingly evident.
Soviet jurists of the "Tunkin School" list three subordinate
principles of proletarian internationalism:
1) Respect for the sovereignty of socialist states on the basis of
which peoples exercise the right to self-determination; 2) Non-
interference in the internal affairs of another state, which re-
flects respect for the national peculiarities and expectations
of each people; 3) full equality of socialist states which reflects
the Marxist-Leninist thesis of the equality of nations and of
workers' parties. 24
All of these principles are made subject to the will of the "people"
who supposedly represent the ideal of true proletarian interna-
tionalism. Should a situation arise where the "people" in a social-
ist state accuse their own governmental leadership of pursuing
policies that were incompatible with proletarian internationalism
and ask for the assistance of fellow socialist states, then such assis-
tance might be rendered under the theory that socialist states are
under an obligation to do so. 25
The Soviet Union used this argument during its intervention in
Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Despite the fact
that forty Czechoslovak party members were alleged to have asked
for such "aid," the doctrine of "intervention by invitation" crum-
bled somewhat when the entire Czechoslovak Government and
Communist Party promptly denied such an invitation. Neverthe-
less, the differentiation of the people from the state (i.e., the governing
organs) in a socialist country presents a danger to the smaller East
European states seeking to preserve their autonomy. Whereas
socialism in official Soviet doctrine is supposed to provide an or-
ganic unity between the state and the people or nation, a differ-
4 G. I. Tunkin, V. I. Lenin i printsipy otnoshenii mezhdu sotsialisti cheskitni
gosudarstvami, in SOVETSKII EZHEGODNIK MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRAVA, 1969 (herein-
after S.E.M.P.) 16-29 (1970).
25 Butler, "Socialist Internationalist Law" or "Socialist Principles of International
Relations?" in 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 796-797 (1971).
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entiation between the two amounts to "turning the wheels of his-
tory backwards."
In Romania, R.C.P. theoretician Ilie Rddulescu denies the exis-
tence of any dichotomy between the state and the nation.2 He
feels that as a result of the victory of socialism society acquires a
homogeneous character. Similarly, Professor C. Vlad appears to
arrive at the same view, 27 although he often tends to be ambigu-
ous in his terminology. He uses the term "nation-state" inter-
changeably with "nation"; nevertheless, a picture emerges of the
organic relationship between the nation (people) and the totality
of social life on the one hand, and on the other hand, the essential
characteristics of this form of human community. Since social-
ism in his view lacks antagonisms, the result is the creation of a
socialist culture common to all. Therefore, socialist nationalism,
he maintains, is different from Western nationalism in that, "it
involves and promotes noble and advanced ideas. "28 Thus, the
nation continues on a higher plane, past epochs of peoples' devel-
opments - it evolves as a whole, as an ethnical social community.
In this reference to bourgeois states, Professor Vlad indicates
the existence of a divergence between the state and the nation or
people, but in his discussion of socialism this becomes increasingly
blurred and eventually eliminated. He states that the appearance
of nations and the formation of nation-states occurred at the same
time and in deep interconnection, yet he holds that it is the social-
ist nation-state which effects the appearance of the "community of
State." '29 In other words, under socialism the national state as a
feature of the nation turns into a community of the nation's politi-
cal life - "an integrating force. "30 Moreover, he claims the work-
ing class further asserts itself as the most advanced social force in
society. Therefore, under Vlad's reasoning there cannot be a con-
tradiction between the nation and the state under socialism.
The above view is in turn antithetical to the Soviet theories of
intervention in socialist states supposedly on behalf of the people
and against the governing organs of the state. This divergence in
Soviet and Romanian positions is significant in the understanding
of the Romanian view of sovereignty.
26 Rdulescu, supra note 14.
27 VLAD, supra note 19, at 37.
2 Id. at 45.
29 Id. at 113.
30 id.
[Vol. 7:169
SOCIALIST CONCEPTS OF SO VEREIGNTY
Socialist Views on Interstate Relations in Perspective
While the "Brezhnev Doctrine" may have disturbed certain
contemporary views of the Soviet attitude towards international
relations and law, many of the elements of the present attitude
have long been entrenched in Soviet policy. During the period
when the Soviet Union was the only socialist state (with the ex-
ception of a totally dependent People's Republic of Mongolia), the
question of external national sovereignty was significantly less
important than in the post World War II era when several
European states came under Soviet dominion. Nevertheless,
Lenin's ideas on relations between socialist states and the
Comintern's view on national rights versus the class struggle de-
serve a brief examination for the light they shed on the contempo-
rary problem of these concepts.
While Lenin rose to the defense of the Soviet state, he still con-
demned nationalism as one of the many subterfuges designed to
obscure the development of the class struggle and to destroy the
"international sense of solidarity of the proletariat.-31 He wrote
that: "To be an internationalist, a person must not only think of his
own nation, but put above it the interests of all . . .fight against
petty national narrowness, isolationism, for the awareness of the
whole and the universal, for the deference of private interests to
general interests. '"32 Of course it is true that tactically, this inter-
nationalism was to extend only to the non-Soviet Communist
parties for the time being, as Lenin felt that in the immediate post-
Revolutionary era it was the duty of the, world communist parties
to build the socialist center, which merely happened to be in
Moscow at this stage.
This Moscow-centered internationalism was one of the key
principles in the formation of the Comintern on March 2, 1919.
At the first meeting in Moscow, the leaders agreed to structure
the organization on the basis of a political, idealogical, and terri-
torial entity whose interests would transcend those of its various
national units. There was to be a central organ with the function
of "subordinating the interests of the movement in each country
to the common interests of the international revolution." 33 Class
struggle was clearly to have precedence over national liberation,
31 BRZEZINSKI, supra note 12, at 33.
32 G. Ginsburgs, Socialist Internationalism and State Sovereignty, in THE YEAR-
BOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS 43 (1971).
33 1 THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONALE, 1919: DOCUMENTS 5 (J. Degras ed. Lon-
don 1956).
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but it was to be a class struggle directed from Moscow. Since the
leaders claimed that the nation was an outmoded institution,
national decision-making would have to be eliminated. In the
"worldwide Soviet Republic" decisions would be made by the
Comintern.34
The centralized form of decision-making by the Russian Com-
munist Party in the' Soviet Union was to be followed worldwide
by the Comintern. The 1919 Hungarian revolution illustrates this
pattern. When B6la Kun established a Hungarian revolutionary
regime (composed of socialists and communists), Lenin called on
him (and Kun accepted) to ensure that the regime would be
Communist instead of Social Democratic while Zinoviev also
notified Kun that the Executive Committee of the Comintern ex-
pected him and the revolutionaries to establish a Communist party
which would clearly give the regime an orthodox Communist pro-
gram. 35 By accepting the orders from the Comintern, Kun there-
by recognized it as the retainer of a higher sovereignty than that of
any national revolutionary government.
It may of course be justifiably argued that the Bolsheviks antic-
ipated the spread of the revolution to Western Europe and with it
an ensuing shift of the center. Nevertheless, as W. Korey has
stated, the Bolsheviks saw the Comintern as the focal point of
power and their belief in its supranational authority (an aspect
which Romania has repeatedly criticized in the 1960's) continued
well after all the revolutionary waves in Western Europe
abated. 36
Even more saliently the Comintern fostered the belief that the
"Socialist commonwealth" had the moral right to engage in mili-
tary intervention in the furtherance of the World Socialist revolu-
tion. Zinoviev, who was the expert on intra-party relations, had
stated frequently that the Red Army should help if there were a
Communist revolution in the Western European countries and
that it would be ready to help established Communist regimes. 3
The Comintern's Executive Committee promised to send help to
34 V. VOROVSKII, 3 SOCHINENIIA 475 (Moscow 1933), in Korey, The Comintern
and the Geneology of the "Brezhnev Doctrine", PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM 53 (May-
June 1969).
35 ZINOVlEV, 1 KOMMUNISTICHESKIn INTERNATSIONAL 83-88 (1919), in Korey,
supra note 34, at 55.
3 Korey, supra note 34, at 55.
37 Zinoviev wrote that the military intervention is to be judged by the criterion
of whether it serves the forces of capitalism or those of socialism. ZINOVIEV, 7(1)
SOCHINENIIA 15-21 (1920).
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Kun's regime in Hungary but the Red Army, although alerted,
could not cross the Ukraine because of the White forces present
there. 38 After this failure to save Kun, Zinoviev advocated inter-
vention into Germany if France became Communist. This built-
in rationale for military intervention was accepted and the hege-
mony of the Russian Communist Party over other parties was
never questioned in the Comintern during its existence to 1943.
Thus, the sovereignty of nation-states was clearly not a prime con-
cern of the Soviet party theoreticians at this stage of Soviet policy
development.
It should be mentioned, however, that there were some Soviet
jurists who were concerned with the norms of international law
and sovereignty. The eminent jurist E. B. Pashukanis did con-
clude in the 1920's that the Soviet Union could and did utilize gen-
erally accepted norms of international law in conducting its rela-
tions with foreign states. In doing so, he expostulated that it
imbued them with a new socialist content. He was, nevertheless,
handicapped in having to explain how a principle of law applied
simultaneously by the U.S.S.R. and a capitalist state could be-
come socialist when only one of the parties was socialist. This
was a particularly sensitive problem because of the Marxist con-
cept of law as an instrument of a ruling class. Pashukanis was
vigorously attacked for his views on international law and sover-
eignty and in 1930 was imprisoned, partly for his "weakly based
philosophy position on form and content." 39
After World War II, with the emergence of several socialist
states, gradual polycentrism became virtually inevitable. In 1966,
Brezhnev himself acknowledged that each party should have the
right to solve the problems facing it in its own way. 40 Neverthe-
less, the preservation of Soviet state power and the promotion of
its security, accented by the Stalinist principle of "socialism in
one state," still characterizes Soviet foreign policy. In 1960, when
the Soviets felt that there was an ideological threat from Czecho-
slovakia, they immediately resorted to Zinoviev's dictum of using
force to protect the "socialist commonwealth."
However, since in the immediate post-war era Soviet domi-
nance was so overwhelming and Stalin's prestige so supreme in
the newly emerging Socialist bloc, Soviet leadership was not ques-
38 Izvestia, Mar. 23, 1919.
39 See, Hazard, Cleansing Soviet International Law of Anti-Marxist Theories, 32
Am. J. Int'l L. 244 (1938).
40 Pravda, Mar. 30, 1966.
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tioned (with the notable exception of the Yugoslav break in 1948)
and concern for state sovereignty was peripheral; the Soviets ac-
tually proposing various schemes for integration in Eastern Eu-
rope with the sanguine approval of the leaders of those states,
including Gheorghiu-Dej of Romania. Milovan Djilas, in his
book Conversations with Stalin, is convinced that the Soviet leaders
were already toying with the idea of reorganizing the Soviet
Union by joining to it the "People's Democracies." The Ukraine,
according to this plan, would be joined with Hungary and Ro-
mania, Byelorussia would be joined with Poland and Czechoslo-
vakia, while the Balkan states would be joined with Russia.4 1
Furthermore, the Balkan Union scheme planned by Tito and
Dimitrov was also originally encouraged by the Kremlin. An
analysis of the reasons for the failure of these schemes is outside
the scope of this article, but what is germane here is the Soviets'
lack of consideration for national sovereignty and their emphasis
instead on Soviet security, or viewed in a very benign light, their
concern for the class struggle. Romania's acquiescence to real
derogations of its sovereignty at this time illuminates the Soviet
bloc's view on international relations immediately after the War.
The shifting perspectives of both Romanian and Soviet policy thus
imply the existence of considerable flexibility.
Another ingredient that sheds light on present Soviet concepts
of sovereignty and international law is manifested by the pecu-
liarly Soviet problem of "double sovereignty:" the sovereignty of
the U.S.S.R. (the federation) and that of its member republics.
The Soviet jurist B. L. Manelis wrote a text on the subject in
1964 in which he attempted to reconcile the two concepts. 42 In
his view, the federation is sovereign because the attributes of sov-
ereignty were attached to it at its provenance in 1922 and not dele-
gated to it by the member Republics. The Republics in turn,
Manelis reasons, did not lose their sovereignty by entering tIe
federation but retained their full sovereign rights. This retention,
on the other hand, did not exclude the existence of the complete
sovereignty of the federation. Manelis explains this apparent
paradox by stating first, that the sovereignty of the federation
and that of its members are in organic unity, and secondly, by
referring to Lenin's declaration that the Republics preserved their
independence on entering the Union, a fact reflected by the provi-
41 M. DJILAS, CONVERSATIONS WITH STALIN 160 (1962).
42 B. MANELIS, 7 SOVETSKOE Gosudarstvo i pravo 17 (1964), English version in
HAZARD, SHAPIRO, AND MAGGS, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 34 (2d ed. 1969).
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sion in the U.S.S.R. Constitution concerning the right of the Re-
publics to secede. Furthermore, this paradox is manifested by the
presence of both Byelorussia and the Ukraine as members of the
United Nations.
Though the above argument may be confusing it might be
somewhat palatable when restricted to the Republics of the Union.
In this manner it could indicate that the Union Republics have
greater rights, let us say, than the 1hnder in the Federal Republic
of Germany or the states of the United States. The conundrum is
that the arguments of Soviet federalism are being brought forward
to support a more cohesive Socialist bloc. Therefore, sovereignty
is being redefined to emphasize the interests of the whole com-
munity as essential to the preservation of the interests of its parts.
An obligation is thus placed upon each Socialist state to aid any
other Socialist nation if its Socialist character is threatened.
Therefore, the Soviet bloc states would have both their de jure and
de facto positions as sovereign entities moved closer to that of the
Soviet republics.43
Such a view on sovereignty, however, is rejected by the Ro-
manians. In their opinion there cannot be a supranational sov-
ereignty and any derogations of national sovereignty are inadmis-
sible. They also speak of an organic unity between the individual
Socialist state and the Socialist community as a whole, but they
emphasize the interests of the parts for the preservation of the
entire community. President Ceau~escu said at the tenth Ro-
manian Communist Party Congress in August 1969 that:
By a world Socialist system, we do not mean a bloc in which
states have emerged with an ensemble, giving up their national
sovereignty. . . . Solidarity and mutual assistance among So-
cialist countries imply relations of equality among all Social-
ist nations and should not lead to interference into the inter-
nal affairs of a people.44
This vital difference regarding sovereignty between the Soviet
Union and Romania bears a direct relationship to Romania's
foreign policy autonomy. The two views on sovereignty can per-
haps best be understood by looking at the approach of the two
countries to international law. Especially in the case of Romania
the maintenance of an autonomous foreign policy and the empha-
sis on her own concept of sovereignty is closely linked to her ap-
proach to international law.
43 Hazard, supra note 4, at 143.
44 Scinteia, Aug. 7, 1969.
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Jus Cogens* orJus Dispositivum**
When the new People's Democracies appeared in the wake of
World War II, the Soviet Union was faced with the task of clari-
fying its legal position vis-a-vis other Socialist states. Pashukanis
was censured in the 1930's for stating that the Soviet Union could
and did utilize generally accepted norms of international law while
imbuing them with a Socialist spirit. While only one other So-
cialist state was in existence (Mongolia) the Soviet Union could
not use a Socialist form in relations with the capitalist states.
With the appearance of other Socialist states with similar social
structures the legal relations between them and the Soviet Union
could now have both a Socialist content and form. Therefore,
the essential question now is whether the Soviet Union has in fact
decided to use "Socialist international law" in its relations with
other Socialist states, or whether as a signatory to the United Na-
tions Charter it uses general international law and its core princi-
ple of jus cogens.
Following the October Revolution, the highest principle of re-
lations between workers of different countries was to be that
element which was cardinal for the victory of the proletariat,
namely, the principle of Socialist (or proletarian) international-
ism. The core of the principle as applied among Socialist states,
is defined as the construction of Socialism and Communism and
the defense of this achievement in the course of the struggle
against the capitalist systems. This in turn entails specific rights
and duties for each Socialist state in its relation with other states,
among them, the duty to pursue close cooperation and mutual as-
sistance in all spheres of the construction of Socialism and Com-
munism, particularly the economic sphere. 45
Socialist internationalism also affects a number of subordinate
principles, including respect for the sovereignty of Socialist states
and non-interference in internal affairs. But, according to Tun-
kin, all these subordinate principles are subject to the will of the
* A body of overriding principles of international law which cannot be altered
by bilateral agreements among states. Its content is supposed to include the pro-
hibition of aggressive war, genocide, trade in slaves, piracy, other crimes against
humanity and suppression of the right of self-determination and sovereignty. It
includes the U.N. Declaration on Sovereignty over Natural Resources and has the
authority of the International Law Commission behind it.
** The-concept allows for the alteration of some minor principles through bi-
lateral agreement.
41 Tunkin, supra note 24, at 16-29. See also, Butler, supra note 25,
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people: the dichotomy between the Socialist state and the "peo-
ple" which was referred to earlier.46 He wrote that, "the Social-
ist principle of respect for sovereignty obliges Socialist states not
only to respect the sovereignty of other Socialist states but also to
defend Socialist sovereignty in accordance with the demands of
proletarian internationalism. " 41 Thus again, the Czechoslovak in-
tervention in 1968 could be seen as in accord with the subordinate
principles of proletarian internationalism.
The question arises, however, whether or not a Socialist in-
ternational law based on the principles of Socialist international-
ism is extant. Two eminent Western jurists, John N. Hazard
and William E. Butler, differ on the matter. Hazard believes
that, in the Soviet view, Socialist international law exists now,
48
while Butler believes that the Soviets regard Socialist internation-
al law as merely emerging so that currently there are only Social-
ist principles of international relations. 49
Tunkin, possibly the most influential Soviet expert on interna-
tional law in the post-war era, has insisted that there is in existence
a body of general international law which should be taught to the
new Soviet generation and used in foreign relations, for he feels
that this body of general international law has evolved to the point
where it no longer contains those principles under which it had
earlier supported colonialism. This law, in his view, is moving
toward the development of a law of peaceful coexistence. Tun-
kin also expostulated that another system was growing up along
side general international law, that of the "fraternal" relations of
proletarian internationalism. It is true that he refers sparingly to
the phrase "Socialist international law" and he does describe
proletarian internationalism as a moral and political principle.
But, in his text, International Law, published in 1962 and revised in
1970,50 he emphasizes this new law which uses only the terminol-
ogy of the principles of general international law and in fact es-
tablishes a new law among Socialist states.
Some other Soviet jurists have rejected such an approach to
international law. Dr. V. M. Shurshalov has written that the So-
cialist states in relations with one another are "applying the prin-
ciples and rules of international law and simultaneously filling
46 Tunkin, supra note 24, at 27.
47 Id.
48 HAZARD, SHAPIRO, AND MAGGS, supra note 42, at 29-32.
49 Butler, supra note 25, at 797.
5o Tunkin, supra note 24.
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the old form with a new socialist content." 51 Thus, the form of
the law does not change in relations between Socialist states.
L. A. Aleksidze, writing in the 1967 Soviet Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law, similarly does not distinguish between the principles of
Socialist international law and the general international legal prin-
ciples of jus cogens. Moreover, he maintains that generally rec-
ognized norms of contemporary international law have an impera-
tive character which includes, "principles strengthening the fun-
damental sovereign rights of states and peoples: . . . respect for
state sovereignty and territorial integrity. ... 52
Nevertheless, it seems that since the 1970 meeting of the So-
viet Society of International Law, Tunkin's view that a new So-
cialist international law has emerged which is new both in content
and form has prevailed.53 Further support for Tunkin is also
rendered by Professor V. I. Lisovskii, who finds that in its rela-
tions with other Socialist states the U.S.S.R. conforms to prin-
ciples of "Socialist international law" which are anchored in the
concept of proletarian internationalism. 51
There is further substantial evidence to support the Hazard
view that the Soviets have accepted a "Socialist international
law" (with its emphasis on the general "Socialist common-
wealth") in their relations with other Socialist states. Soviet in-
tervention into Czechoslovakia, for instance, could be fitted into
the framework of this new law, and indeed Tunkin does so. He
writes, "The events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia have shown how
dangerous for the cause of Socialism can be the manifestations of
nationalism in conditions of the activization of anti-imperialist
forces in a country together with the active support of imperialist
reaction."55
According to this view, the new law is in line with proletarian
internationalism, but it is quite different from general interna-
tional law, especially as regards the salient concept of sovereignty.
Tunkin writes that both general and Socialist international law
respect the concept of sovereignty, but that the two understand it
51 Hazard, supra note 4, at 143.
52 L. Aleksidze, Problema jus cogens v sovremennom mezhdunarodnom prave, in
S.E.M.P., 1969 at 144 (1970). Cited also in Butler, supra note 25, at 799.
13 HAZARD, SHAPIRO, AND MAGGS, supra note 42, at 33.
54 V. LiSOVSKII, MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVA (1970), in Hazard, supra note 4, at
144.
55 Tunkin, supra note 24, at 25.
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differently.56 As we have seen, Socialist international law in-
cludes the principle that those things that are held to constitute
capitalistic inroads in a Socialist society may be legally prevented.
At the same time, Socialist states insist upon maintaining the
principle of sovereignty as developed in general international law
when speaking of relations between themselves and capitalist
states. This dual approach, even if it represents as Butler says,
merely principles of Socialist international relations, appears to
strike at the general concept of jus cogens, the inability of the
parties involved to change the law. A double set of laws poses a
very dangerous trap for the Socialist states in Eastern Europe, es-
pecially for Romania which has attempted to safeguard its sov-
ereignty on all possible occasions. But, there may be some de-
fenses.
The possible pivot of the defense here may be turned on the
Soviet claim that they respect jus cogens. Even Tunkin admits to
the supremacy of the principles ofjus cogens:
As is well known, the difference between the principles of
jus cogens and other principles and norms of international law
consists of the fact that derogation from them on the basis of
bilateral agreements between states is not permitted. The
Vienna convention on the law of treaties of 1969 speaks only of
the interrelationship between international agreements (it
would be more specific to talk of local international agree-
ments) and the principles of jus cogens, but also the provisions
of the convention could be equally applicable to the relation-
ship of customary local international norms and the principles
of jus cogens.57
Nevertheless, Tunkin claims that Socialist international law, be-
ing different from general international law, may be applied with-
out serving to contravene jus cogens. He argues first, there would
be a specific norm of a general law, being locally applied, and
second, the local norm would hold precedence over the general
norm.
The first proposition rests on the principle that lex specialis
derogat generalis. Socialist law would be a specific form of inter-
national law. Tunkin writes:
In accordance with the well known proposition according to
which a special norm squeezes to the corner a general norm,
56 Tunkin, supra note 4, at 493-495.
17 Tunkin, Sovetskii Ezhegoduik Mezidunarodnogo Prava, (S.E.M.P.).
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in those situations when we have [pertinent] socialist principles
and norms, they shall operate. .... 58
Yet, in view of what Tunkin has written it is rather difficult to see
Socialist law as a specific form of the general international law.
Tunkin's second argument is that jus cogens allows for the
"progressive development of international law and the creation
• ..of local international norms which go far beyond the norms of
the general international . ..and are a reflection of a higher stage
of international integration, than general international law." 59
It would be difficult to say that this is merely a matter of interna-
tional interpretation, for when the operation of Socialist interna-
tional law and proletarian internationalism is taken into account
it amounts to an alteration of the substance of jus cogens. As Wil-
liam Butler has said, it is doubtful that many jurists will find the
labelling of a particular norm "higher" than jus cogens, a persua-
sive argument when the local norm seems intended to permit that
which jus cogens would proscribe. Thus, there are gaps in the So-
viet argument which should allow for considerable interposition of
doctrinal defenses by those faced with "Socialist international
law."
The Romanian approach to the question of international law
and sovereignty is considerably different from that of the Soviet
Union. The Romanian "Declaration of Independence" in 1964,
issued in the face of Soviet pressures for integration, called for
national independence and sovereignty and equality among
states.60  The present Romanian view also emphasizes national
sovereignty and general international law. Dr. Ion Voicu, writing
in Era Socialista in 1973, claims that the norms of contemporary law
give juridical expression to the imperatives of peace and security
among countries and peoples.61 And, of the principles which
form the substance of international legality, he considers sover-
eignty to be of overwhelming importance in our epoch. Moreover,
he feels that the activation of the other principles, of correlative
rights and duties which belong to the members of the international
community, is dependent upon respect for sovereignty.
58 Tunkin, supra note 4, at 504-505; see also Chris Osakwe, "Socialist Inter-
national Law Revisited," 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 596-597 (1972).
59 Tunkin, S.E.M.P. (1969), at 28.
60 Scdnteia, April 26, 1964.
61 Voicu Ion, "National Sovereignty and the Doctrine of International Law,"
Era Socialista, (Bucharest) Sept. 18, 1973, at 41.
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It should be pointed out however, that respect for general in-
ternational law and sovereignty does not make the Romanian
views pro tanto antipodal to those of the Soviet Union, for the latter
also professes to respect these principles. It is rather the Roma-
nian interpretation of these principles which shows the difference.
President Ceau~escu said in 1970 that, "People see and desire to
see in the relations among Socialist states the prototype of the re-
lations of tomorrow, of the day when Socialism will triumph in
the whole world, that is full equality in rights [of states], respect
for national independence and sovereignty. '-62 He does not refer
to the existence of any form of Socialist international law but
merely Socialist relations among states and includes a great deal
of emphasis on individual state sovereignty instead of common-
wealth sovereignty. Thus, the Romanian leader attaches a sig-
nificantly different meaning to legal and quasi-legal terminology
than is done in the Soviet Union.
Despite frequent references to Socialist or proletarian interna-
tionalism, the international law that Romania subscribes to is gen-
eral international law. The U.N. Charter seems to be the highest
point of reference together with the principles of jus cogens that is
associated with it.
The Romanian delegate to the U.N. Legal Conference in 1972,
Dumitru Ceasu, for instance, declared that there should be a clear
definition of terms in international law:
No reasoning, be it of a political, military or economic nature,
be it related to the internal or external policies of a state can
serve as justification for the use of arms against another
state. 6
3
He also said that national territory is inviolable and that no occu-
pation, not even a temporary one, regardless of motives given, can
be condoned. Ceasu, in a way was merely reiterating the views of
President Ceau~escu, who declared following the Czechoslovak
intervention that no motive could justify intervention by a Social-
ist state into the affairs of another.64
The key writers on international law and relations in Romania
such as V. Duculescu, C. Vlad, I. Maxilu and G. Moca invariably
refer to the U.N. Charter to justify their concepts of law among
62 N. Ceausescu, quoted by C. Lzirescu, "Sovereignty," Lupta, April 1970,
at 8.
63 D. Ceasu, Scanteia, Nov. 4, 1972.
64 Scinteia, Aug. 22, 1968.
1975]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
nations as well as to Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Duculescu tries
to enhance the importance of sovereignty by stating that signifi-
cant resolutions of the U.N. could only have been adopted by
taking into account the interests of national sovereign states.65
Similarly, Moca, in his book State and Sovereignty,66 attempts to
bolster his arguments on sovereignty by citing the Declaration of
the 25th Anniversary Session of the U.N. General Assembly of
1970 which specified that states cooperate in accordance with the
principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in internal af-
fairs. 67 This ties in well with what Ceau~escu said in 1969, name-
ly, that there must not only be respect for the U.N. Charter, but
that there is only one international law for all countries. 68 This,
of course, hardly fits in with Tunkin's arguments of a specific So-
cialist international law.
Perhaps the best exposition of Romanian views on the principles
of international law and relations has been put forward by Alex-
andru C. Aureliu in his book, The Principles of Relations Among Na-
tions.69  He states that all countries, irrespective of their area, the
size of their population, their political or economic power, are
equal in their exercise of sovereignty and rights."O In turn he feels
that sovereign equality consists of the following principles: a) re-
lations between states that must be based on free expression of
the will of these states; b) states must enjoy equal rights to partici-
pate in the examination of the international problems which af-
fect them; c) each state must be individually in a position to decide
whether an international problem is within its interest, and this
decision does not have to take into consideration the interests of
another state; d) in the framework of international relations and
treaties, states must occupy equal judicial positions; e) in interna-
tional conferences and organizations, states should have equal
rights to participate in debate and have equal roles; f) the decisions
of such meetings can bind only those states which have declared
6S V. Duculescu, "The Sovereign State in International Relations," Era, No.
13, July 1973.
66 G. Moca, Suveranitatea de Stat Teorii BurIeze Studii Critic, (State Sover-
eignty: Critical Study of Bourgeois State Theories), Editura Politica, (Bucharest),
1973.
67 Id. at 108.
68 N. Ceau~escu, cited by I. Closca in "The Necessity for a Negotiated
Settlement of International Issues," Lupta, Feb. 1969.
69 A. C. Aureliu, Principiile Relatijior Dintre State, (The Principles of Relations
Among States), Editura Politic4, (Bucharest), 1966.
70 Id. at 106.
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themselves ready to adopt these decisions; and, g) non-interfer-
ence in the affairs of another state, which constitutes one of the
basic principles of contemporary international law. 7 1
The whole concept of a centrally directed "Socialist common-
wealth" is anathema to Romania. There is a constant reiteration
of this rejection of a center in all Romanian literature and it is
bound to permeate Romania's relations with the Soviet Union.
A May 1967 editorial of Lupta de Clasa stated that the position of
each Communist party as the vanguard political force of the work-
ing class cannot be made compatible with the existence of an in-
ternational coordinating center. The Romanians are also quick to
cite the Moscow Declaration of June 1969 which stated in its
final document that, "each party, guiding itself upon Marxist-
Leninist principles, keeping in mind the concrete national condi-
tions, elaborates its policies in a totally independent way."72
Romania insists that her own Communist party is the best judge of
problems in the country and that there should be no outside inter-
ference whatever.
Such an approach to Socialist internationalism and to "Social-
ist commonwealth" cohesion apparently stems from Romania's
attitude towards the dialectical conflict between class struggle and
national liberation rights. It is interesting to note how much
greater emphasis her theoreticians place on the latter.
Gheorghe Moca, in his book The State and Sovereignty, which was
favorably received in China and Yugoslavia, expressed the Ro-
maman view of the present epoch when he stated that at the mo-
ment there are two trends in international relations: imperialistic
states are seeking to impose their own hegemonic will by means
of their great relative power while, on the other hand, small and
middle-sized states are increasingly demonstrating their desire to
assert their sovereign rights.7 3
The Secretary General of the Editorial Board of Lupta de
Clas , C. L~z~rescu, similarly asserted that contemporary inter-
national life is characterized by the struggle between the "ad-
vanced" anti-imperialist forces and the "reactionary" forces of
imperialism. 74 Professor loan Ceterchi has also declared at the
recent IXth World Congress of the International Political Science
71 Id. at 106-123.
72 Quoted by A. Rosetti, Scanteia, June 20, 1969.
1 Moca, supra note 66, at 133.
14 C. LUzirescu, "The Evolution of the Contemporary World and The Princi-
ples of International Relations," Lupta, Sept. 1967, at 14.
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Association that the current world fight against what he called
the quest for world domination by some powers, and the struggle
for the achievement of national unity combine to form an integral
part of the general fight against imperialism. Moreover, he as-
serted that the transition from capitalism to socialism is "indis-
solubly linked with the necessity of the assertion of the nation at a
higher level and linked to a national revival."5 From this empha-
sis on the national unit as opposed to the universality of the class
struggle it would then logically follow that Romania would lean
more toward general international law and the security of jus
cogens than toward recognition of a regional application of Social-
ist international law.
Again, this is not to say that Romania ab initio rejects prole-
tarian internationalism. The term is used very frequently, but as
was previously mentioned the meaning is different from that
which is understood by Soviet theorists such as Tunkin. The
flow of strength is from the particular to the general. As Con-
stantin Vlad stated in his paper at the 1972 Prague Conference,
Romania pursues a foreign policy which it believes to serve its own
fundamental interests and implicitly the cause of the national and
social liberation of all people.x6 In this sense, and in this sense
only, national and international interests in Romania are blurred.
Another key caveat must be made at this stage. Romania does
not enter into direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. As
divergent as her views may be from the norm in the Soviet bloc,
she presents them obliquely and gradually. To use communica-
tions theory terminology, she sends out an extended signal. The
dissimilarities in these views on the separation of the nation-state
and the people and on the content and applicability of Socialist
international law in the "Socialist commonwealth" are also pre-
sented circuitously by Romania. She incorporates as much as
possible of the Soviet view into her theories and attacks the rest
indirectly - usually by criticizing Western proponents of "limited
sovereignty" and of world integration and government. This eso-
teric form of communication coupled with partial incorporation
should be a most effective element for the defense of foreign policy
autonomy by a smaller Soviet bloc state.
Socialist Integration or Socialist Cooperation?
The integration of the Soviet bloc has been advocated at vari-
75 Ceterchi, supra note 22.
76 C. Vlad, World Marxist Review, (Belgrade), July 1972.
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ous times and to various degrees by Soviet leaders in the post-war
era. The two main cooperative organs in Eastern Europe, the
Warsaw Pact and Comecon, have likewise been altered to try to
aid these aims. Some of the most influential Soviet jurists have
also provided legal-theoretical bases for integration besides the
initial Marxist-Leninist doctrine of world working class solidarity.
G. I. Tunkin for instance, feels that certain rights and duties are
derived from the principles of proletarian internationalism for So-
cialist states in relations with each other, among them the duty to
pursue close cooperation."
Professor Lisovskii, a Tunkin ally, elaborates on this argument
by referring to Brezhnev's speech at the 23rd Soviet Communist
Party Congress in 1966 when Brezhnev had said in effect, that the
national economies of the Socialist states must be integrated to
provide for specialization and cooperation of production in order to
keep abreast with the technological revolution and with capital-
ism.78  Moreover, Lisovskii feels that the East European com-
mercial treaties, the Warsaw Pact and the 'treaties of friendship,
mutual aid and cooperation show that the Socialist states could
not limit themselves in their mutual relations to the application of
generally accepted principles of international law. Yet, to the Ro-
manians, who insist on strict adherence to general international
law, such an attitude remains patently unacceptable.
In effect, it was Khrushschev's attempt at rationalization of
production in the Soviet bloc that brought the Soviet-Romanian
differences out into the open. The Romanians refused to sub-
scribe to supranational planning and in 1964 issued their "Declara-
tion" which rejected any such planning or restructuring of Come-
con into a supranational organization as an infringement of their
sovereignty and as being contrary to what they perceived to be the
essence of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.
Of course, the Soviets have always maintained that neither
the Warsaw Pact nor Comecon are supranational organizations.
Indeed, Comecon has an ad hoc type of structure and the Roman-
ians in objecting to the proposal to give it greater planning and
integrating functions were opting for a status quo which is for-
mally praised by the Soviets. As a result, even in 1971, when they
finally subscribed to Comecon s comprehensive integration pro-
gram adopted at Bucharest in July of that year, the Romanians
stressed that in their understanding Socialist integration is dif-
77 Tunkin, supra note 24, at 25.
78 Lisovskii, supra note 54, at 51.
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ferent from capitalist integration, for the former does not mean any
infringement upon national independence and sovereignty and
does not lead to the setting up of bodies for supra-state planning
and organization. The report of the agreement in the official
R.C.P. organ, Scanteia stated:
The program endorsed reasserts the principles of the Come-
con charter, which proclaims that this body was founded on
the basis of sovereign equality of the member states [and]
proceeds according to the principles of fully equal rights, ob-
servance of national sovereignty and interest, mutual advan-
tage and assistance.79
The chief writers on the question of sovereignty, such as Pro-
fessors Ceterchi, Vlad and Paruta, all agree that, while coopera-
tion is valuable, it cannot be used to derogate from national sov-
ereignty or to set up supranational organizations. Ceterchi warns
that cooperation must not be equated with the internationalization
of the forces of production by the transfer of part of the state sov-
ereignty to international organizations. And, in cooperation, he
again warns that all relations between states should be based on
the fundamental principles of contemporary international lav. 8  [Em-
phasis supplied]
Professor Vlad in turn attacks Western proponents of integra-
tion such as Zbigniew Brzezinski. 81 He contends that a state
must develop its economy as a national economy. Integration is
to come only as a requirement of "determinism," for if it is forced,
it is liable to undermine the national life of the people.2 Thus,
in Vlad's view, increased cooperation is to come at the pace of the
specific Romanian needs and not those of the Soviet Union or the
"Socialist commonwealth."
Mihai Paruta also warns that the principles of collaboration
and "comradely assistance" cannot be opposed to the principle of
sovereignty, equality of rights, and non-interference in domestic
affairs.83  In his opinion, "comradely assistance" cannot be con-
ceived without full equality of rights and the latter "necessarily
implies strict observance of independence and sovereignty, as well
as mutual non-interference in domestic affairs. "84
7,Scanteia, Aug. 1, 1971.
" Ceterchi, supra note 22.
81 VLAD, supra note 19, at 180.
82 Id. at 92.
83Mihai Paruta, "Setting International Economic Relations on A New Ba-
sis," in Viata Economica, (Bucharest), No. 41, Oct. 12, 1973.
s4 Id.
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The assumption in this preoccupation with national sovereign-
ty is that by strengthening the nation economically, the Socialist
world as a whole is strengthened. Again, it is a flow from the
particular to the general, antithetical to the Soviet view. The
manner in which this flow is to take place is explained by Ilie
Radulescu who completes the blanket coverage that Romanian
theoreticians have given to integration. He wrote in 1973 that:
Internal revolutionary forces have a decisive role in changing
society on a social basis within the dialectical relationship
between the national factor and the international; in fact the
national factor, the internal development of the countries and
the increase in their economic and technical-scientific potential,
are responsible for the viability of the international factor.85
This reasoning is applied by Romania in its relations with the
Warsaw Pact. Not only has it refused to recognize any suprana-
tional qualities in the Pact, but it has also criticized the military
bloc concept by attacking NATO and has carried on an indepen-
dent military policy which, it claims, simultaneously strengthens
the entire Socialist bloc through the process of strengthening Ro-
manian defense.
In regard to the conundrum of Socialist integration, it should
be remembered that despite its differences with the Soviet Union,
Romania has avoided direct confrontation. Any attacks on Soviet
concepts have been indirect, usually consisting of demolishing a
Western "straw-man." Communication with the Soviets is again
esoteric. In formulating their arguments the Romanians, as seen
in the works of Ceterchi, Vlad, Paruta and R~dulescu, have also
been skillful at "restriction through partial incorporation." As
both Romanian and Soviet policies have gone through shifting
perspectives of international relations and law, there is considerable
room to maneuver.
Conclusion
There are clearly real differences between the Soviet Union
and Romania on the broad concept of sovereignty. They disagree
on the hypothesis of a dichotomy in the views and aims of the
state on one hand and the people in a Socialist country on the
other. Similarly, they differ on the content and applicability of
Socialist international law, with the Soviet Union declaring that
such interventions as that into Czechoslovakia fall within the legal-
15 Ilie Rdulescu, "The National and the International Aspects of Contem-
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ity of Socialist concepts while Romania maintains that only gen-
eral international law is applicable and that no derogation of
sovereignty is admissable. They also differ in the dilemma posed
by the necessity of emphasizing either the international class
struggle or national liberation. Whereas the Soviet Union leans
toward the former, Romania is emphatically on the side of na-
tional liberation and sovereignty. As far as integration is con-
cerned, the two parties are also far apart. While the Soviet Union
favors increased integration in the Socialist world with added
specialization of production and more joint international projects,
Romania is opposed to anything but minimal supranational co-
operation and vehemently opposes the creation of any supra-
national structure. While both see an organic unity between the
national and the international in the Socialist world, the Soviets
see the flow of strength from the general to the particular, whereas
the Romanians cling to the opposite view.
Nevertheless, it should not be believed that the Soviet position,
pro tanto excludes that of Romania. The Soviet Union does hold
views similar to those of Romania on the endurance of the nation-
state. It should also be remembered that the Soviets are signa-
tories of the U.N. Charter and have admitted that general inter-
national law is no longer simply bourgeois law. Even Tunkin is
reluctant to reject outright the principle of jus cogens and instead
has tried to alter it by interpretation. And, similarly, it should
be recognized that the Soviets, despite their efforts at Socialist
integration, still do not formally admit to supranationality. Thus,
there are grounds for compromise if Romania is skillful enough.
Despite her independent stance in foreign affairs, Romania
has avoided direct confrontations with the Soviet Union. Her as-
sertions of independence, her insistence on sovereignty in terms of
general international law have not been made through overt at-
tacks on conflicting Soviet concepts. Rather, there has been an
esoteric type of communication where Romanian theorists have
used very abstract forms to attack Western scholars who ex-
pounded identical concepts to those put forth by the Soviet Union.
Very significantly, the Romanians have also used the concept of
exclusion through partial incorporation by repeatedly resorting to
Soviet pronouncements to defend themselves.
Tunkin was once asked whether the principle of proletarian
internationalism was applicable in connection with Soviet rela-
tions with the Peoples' Republic of China. At this point he
stated that the principle was a moral and a political one of the
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international workers' movement,86 thereby, seemingly excluding
the prospect that the Socialist countries had a legal obligation
to intervene against the offending Chinese leadership despite the
fact that the interests of the people of China and other Socialist
states are supposed to be identical. What Romania may hope
then, is that with skillful diplomacy the Soviet Union may allow
it the same legal position as that of the Peoples' Republic of
China.
86 Tunkin, supra note 24, at 28.
